ABSTRACT With the rapid development of network technology and cloud computing, more and more organizations and users outsource their data into the cloud server. In order to protect data privacy, the sensitive data have to be encrypted, which increases the heavy computational overhead and brings great challenges to resource-constraint devices. In this paper, we propose secure index based on counting Bloom filter (CBF) for ranked multiple keywords search. In the proposed scheme, several algorithms are designed to maintain and lookup CBF, while a pruning algorithm is used to delete the repeated items for saving the space. Besides, the relevance scores are encrypted by the Paillier cryptosystem. It ensures that the same relevance scores are encrypted into different bits, which can resist the statistical analyses on the ciphertext of the relevance scores. Moreover, since the Paillier cryptosystem supports the homomorphic addition of ciphertext without the knowledge of the private key, the major computing work in ranking could be moved from user side to the cloud server side. Therefore, the proposed scheme has huge potentials in resource-constraint mobile devices such as 5G mobile terminals. Security analyses prove that the proposed scheme can prevent the information leakage. Experiment results guarantee that computation overhead of the proposed scheme in user side is low.
an outsourced inverted index [17] . Since relevance scores following different distributions, their relevance score transformation function needs to be rebuilt when a new item is inserted. Wang et al. [18] proposed a secure ranked keyword search scheme which combines the inverted index with orderpreserving symmetric encryption (OPSE). Cao et al. [13] proposed a basic idea for privacy-preserving multiple keywords ranked search over encrypted cloud data (MRSE) based on secure inner product computation. In order to calculate the similarity of documents, each document vector should be multiplied by a query vector that requires a large amount of computation. Yu et al. proposed a two-round searchable encryption (TRSE) scheme that supports top-k multikeyword retrieval [19] . Nevertheless, TRSE is inefficient for practical utilization on mass encrypted data since the existing fully homomorphic encryptions have the huge algorithmic complexity, large key size, and ciphertext expansion [20] . Chen et al. [21] proposed a hierarchical clustering method to meet the demand for fast ciphertext search within a big data environment. Their approach can reach a linear computational complexity even if the size of the document collection increases exponentially. Fu et al. [22] adopt vector space model to build the searchable index to achieve accurate search results. To improve search efficiency, they designed a treebased index structure which supported parallel search to take advantage of the powerful computing capacity and resources of the cloud server. Goh proposed a security definition to formalize the security requirements of Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE), and proposed a search technique based on Bloom filters [23] . This technique does not care about the relevance of the search result.
Most of the above searchable encryption methods calculate the relevance of documents by vector space model, where each document is indexed by a vector. Every dimension of the vector stands for a keyword and its value represents whether the keyword appears or not in the document. Similarly, the query is also represented by a vector. Their schemes have not the problem of index lookup, but in order to calculate the relevance of documents, each document vector should be multiplied by query vector that requires a large amount of computation. Moreover, with the rapid growth of data volume, these approaches will be inefficient. Therefore, how to build an efficient and secure index with support of ranked search is still a challenge.
Inspired by Goh's approach [23] , we define a new scheme named secure index based on counting Bloom filter (SICBF) which supports multiple keywords ranked search. The proposed scheme returns the matched encrypted documents like traditional plaintext retrieval and keeps the privacy of retrieval. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We propose SICBF for multiple keywords ranked search over the encrypted cloud data. Several algorithms are designed to maintain and lookup counting Bloom filter (CBF), while a pruning algorithm is presented to delete the repeat items in order to save the space.
• Our approach supports multiple keywords ranked search on encrypted data without privacy leakage of index, relevance scores and search keywords. The major computing work in rank is directly done by the cloud server on the encrypted relevance scores. Our approach has a low computational overhead in user side, it is suitable for the resource-constraint mobile devices search over encrypted data.
• Security analyses demonstrate that the proposed scheme can eliminate the information leakage and data privacy is ensured. Furthermore, the performance analyses and experiential results show that our scheme is efficient for practical utilization. The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the related techniques used in our scheme. We provide the scenario, design goals and notations in Section 3. The algorithms designed to maintain and lookup CBF are introduced in Section 4. Section 5 provides the detailed description of our proposed scheme. Security analyses and performance evaluations are presented in Section 6 and Section 7, respectively. The conclusions will be drawn in Section 8.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. INVERTED INDEX
Inverted index is the standard data structure in most information retrieval systems. An inverted index is a set of posting lists, each of which contains the posting elements. Related techniques to construct inverted index are similar to the schemes proposed in [24] and [25] . By a straightforward scanning of posting lists, it is easy to uncover the content of indexed documents. In order to protect the privacy, the terms, the terms' position and frequency need to be encrypted, which make it very difficult to calculate relevance scores. Posting lists only contain document identifiers and relevance scores to simplify inverted index and save storage overhead in our scheme, as shown in Figure 1 .
In our scheme, TF*IDF is used to calculate relevance scores, as shown in equation 1. Where RSC(Q, d) is the relevance score of the document d in the query Q, TF q is number of occurrences of query term q in d, |d| is the document length measured in terms, N is the total number of document collection, n d (q) denotes the number of documents which contains term q. array of m bits to represent a set S = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } with n items, where the initially value of m bits are 0. The filter uses k independent hash functions h 1 (x), h 2 (x), . . . , h k (x) with range {1, 2, . . . , m}. These hash functions map each item in S to a random number uniform in the range {1, 2, . . . , m}. For each item x ∈ S, the bits with index of h i (x) are set to 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, so it means the same index of array can be set to 1 multiple times. To check if an item y is in S, we check whether the bits with index of h i (x) are set to 1. If all bits with index of h i (x) are set to 1, we assume that y is in S. Here, a false positive may be caused in a Bloom filter [27] . The false positive probability is f An example of Bloom filter using three hash functions is shown in Figure 2 , which indicates that two hash outputs may result in a same bit-index. Fortunately, the probability of all hash functions with the same outputs is very low, especially when m is very large. In practice, k is an integer, and both m/n and k should be thought of as constants. For example, when m/n = 10, k = 6, the false positive probability is just over 8.0 × 10 −3 . When m/n = 100, k = 6, the false positive probability is only 4.0 × 10 −8 .
Deleting elements from a Bloom filter cannot be done simply by changing ones to zeros, as a single bit may correspond to multiple items. Counting Bloom filter (CBF) extends the Bloom filter by replacing each bit in the filter with a counter [28] . The counters track the number of items currently hashed to that location. We will design the maintenance and lookup algorithms for CBF in section 4.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT A. SCENARIO
In the proposed scheme, retrieve service over encrypted cloud data is considered, as illustrated in Figure 3 , in which three different entities are involved: data owner (DO), cloud server (CS) and authorized user (AU).
Data owner has a collection of documents D which contains privacy information. Since the cloud server cannot be fully trusted, D must be encrypted into the ciphertext C before outsourcing. Any kind of information leakage that affects documents privacy is not allowed. Data owner wants cloud server to provide keyword retrieval service to him and other authorized user, so data owner needs to build index I. To protect privacy, index I is encrypted into index I'. Index I' and ciphertext C would be outsourced to cloud server by the data owner. Authorized user provides search keywords Q, for privacy consideration, the authorized user first generates a trapdoor T Q according to Q and sends T Q to cloud server, then cloud server lookup index I' and return the matched encrypted documents. In order to improve retrieval accuracy, search results should be ranked. Finally, the authorized user decrypts and makes use of the matched documents.
In our scenario shown in Figure 3 , the cloud server knows the encrypted documents C, index I' and trapdoor T . The confidentiality of documents, index and trapdoor can be easily ensured by traditional cryptography, various search privacy requirements involved in retrieval procedure are more complex and difficult.
B. DESIGN GOALS
In order to enable ranked searchable encryption for effective utilization of the encrypted data, we propose secure index based on CBF for ranked search over encrypted data with following goals:
• Ranked Multiple Keywords Search: To design effective multiple keywords search scheme which support result relevance ranking for the encrypted data.
• Security Guarantee: To prevent the cloud server from directly obtaining or inferring additional information of encrypted documents, encrypted index and search keywords, we set a series of security requirements:
1) Data confidentiality presents the confidentiality of documents, index and trapdoor. It can be done by traditional cryptography. 2) Index privacy prevents the attacker from inferring the plaintext of the terms stored in index by statistical attacks. The cloud server can obtain the information such as the keyword frequency, relevance scores distribution. These information are helpful in statistical attacks. 3) Keyword privacy hides the search keywords by generating trapdoors which leak no information about the keywords. The trapdoor generation function should be a randomized one instead of being deterministic, i.e. even the same search request should be indicated by different trapdoor so as to prevent statistical attacks.
• Efficiency: Above goals should be achieved with low computational overhead in user side. The major VOLUME 4, 2016 computing work in rank is done by the cloud server to minimize the computation on user side.
C. NOTATIONS
We define the notations as follows:
• D-the plaintext document collection, denoted as a set of
• C-the encrypted document collection stored in the cloud server, denoted as C = (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n ), C i is the encrypted document corresponding to the plaintext document D i .
• id(C i )-the identifier of document C i that can uniquely locate the encrypted document C i .
• W -the keyword set extracted from the plaintext document collection D, denoted as W = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w l ).
• W -the encrypted W , denoted as W = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w l ).
• I -the inverted index built from the plaintext document collection D, including the keyword set W , and posting lists of corresponding keyword in W . The element of the posting lists contains document identifier id(C i ) and relevance score RSC ij , that is id(C i )||RSC ij .
• I -the encrypted inverted index I , the keyword set W is encrypted by traditional symmetric encryption, the relevance score RSC ij is encrypted by the Paillier cryptosystem.
• Q-representing the keywords in a search request, denoted as Q = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w r ).
• T Q -the trapdoor for the search keywords Q.
• SICBF-A m bits CBF and index I , using CBF to lookup index I .
IV. ALGORITHMS FOR COUNTING BLOOM FILTER
In this section, we present some algorithms for CBF. In our scheme, we will build and lookup the SICBF index by these algorithms.
A. THE BASIC ALGORITHMS
There is an array C of m counters where each counter C i is associated with i bucket of the hash table. We compute k hash functions h 1 (x), h 2 (x), . . . , h k (x) on each input item and increment corresponding k counters indexed by their hash values. The item T is stored in the list A i associated with k buckets. As shown in Figure 4 . The algorithm 1, 2 and 3 describe how to insert, delete and search an item in CBF respectively. Where h i (x) denotes array index of item x mapped to the array, C h i (x) is count value of the counter in the array index h i (x), index of min{∪ k i=1 C h i (x) } is the array index of the counter with minimum count value in {C h 1 (x) , C h 2 (x) , . . . , C h k (x) }, and A i is the post list of the ith counter. 
Algorithm 2 Delete an item from CBF 1: CBFDeleteItem(x) 2: for i = 1 to k do 3:
if (x ∈ A I ) then 5: return A I (x)
B. THE PRUNED ALGORITHMS
We need to maintain up to k copies of each item which require k time's memory in CBF. In fact, we just need one copy with the minimum counter value, and the other k − 1 copies can be deleted for memory optimization. The procedure of deleting excess copies is named as pruning, which is illustrated in Figure 5 . Each counter value can not be changed in the process of pruning, so the counter value will not reflect actual number of items in the lists like before pruning. For a given item x, the bucket with the index of
} always contains the item. The algorithm 4 describes the pruning of CBF. After pruning CBF, the operations of insertion and deletion without special processing can result in an incorrect search. For example, in Figure 5 , item T 1 maps to lists {A 1 , A 3 , A 5 } with counter values {2, 2, 3}. If a new item x is inserted into CBF, then a collision with item T 1 at the bucket{A 1 } will produce. Therefore, the counter C 1 will be increased to 3, while the counter C 3 has the minimum value 2. However, because of the pruning, the list A 3 does not contain the item T 1 . According to the search algorithm 3, we will not be able to find the item T 1 in the CBF. for each x in A i do 4 :
for l = 1 to k do 6 :
In order to avoid this incorrect search, we can modify the inserting algorithm 1 as algorithm 5. In order to insert an item, the corresponding k counters increase by 1, and the smallest counter of the items in these k buckets might be altered. Hence, the items in these k buckets need to be re-inserted, but we do not need to increase the values of all counters. As shown in Figure 6 , we just need to find the smallest counters of these items and insert them into the buckets of the corresponding smallest counters. 
V. SICBF INDEX
The inverted index structure is introduced into the SICBF instead of sub-index for each document. The framework of SICBF mainly consists of six algorithms: Keygen, Indexbuild, CBFbuild, Trapdoor, Indexsearch and Rankresult. It can be divided into two phases including Setup and Retrieval, as shown in Figure 7 .
For security concerns, the work in setup phase should be done by the data owner. The data owner firstly generates the secret key of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), public key and private key of the the Paillier cryptosystem by Keygen. 
A h i (x) = φ, C h i (x) + + 6: for each x in insertlist do 7 :
A I = A I ∪ x and encrypts the score by the Paillier cryptosystem, builds inverted index I , and encrypts index I into I . Since index I is totally disorder, in order to efficiently lookup I and prevent the statistical attacks from the index lookup, the algorithm CBFbuild builds CBF to lookup index I . Finally, the data user encrypts documents D into ciphertext C, and outsources C,I ,CBF to the cloud server.
In retrieval phase, the data user and the cloud server are both involved. The user firstly provides search keywords Q. The algorithm Trapdoor generates a trapdoor T Q for Q and sends it to the cloud server. The algorithm Indexsearch lookups index I by CBF after receiving the trapdoor T Q , and the matched documents will be merged that the same documents' relevance scores will be added on ciphertext at the server side. Then the merged documents' identifiers and their encrypted relevance scores are sent back to the user. The algorithm Rankresult decrypts the scores and ranks them at the user side, and then selects top-k documents identifier and gets the corresponding encrypted documents from the cloud server. Finally, the data user decrypts the selected top-k encrypted documents in local.
A. SETUP PHASE OF SICBF INDEX
The setup phase includes three algorithms Keygen, Indexbuild and CBFbuild.
• Keygen(s, x =< w i , p >
4:
CBFInsertPruned(x)
B. RETRIEVAL PHASE OF SICBF INDEX
The retrieval phase involves Trapdoor, Indexsearch and Rankresult.
• Trapdoor(KP D , Q): Given a secret key KP D and search keywords Q, outputs trapdoor T Q . We add some randomized keywords in request Q to ensure sufficient nondeterminacy in trapdoor generation. The added randomized 
T Q = T Q ∪ h 7: return T Q Algorithm 9 Search index 1: Searchindex(T Q , CBF, I ) 2: pl = φ 3: for each h in T Q do 4: for each t in A I (h) do 5: if (∪ k j=1 h j (t) == h) then 6: pl = pl ∪ CBFSearchItem(t).p 7: pl = merge(pl) 8: return pl keywords do not appear in index, which ensures that the search result is not affected. The procedure of trapdoor generation is given in Algorithm 8.
• Indexsearch(T Q , CBF, I ): Given a trapdoor T Q and encrypted index I , lookup index I by CBF. In order to reduce the computation of user side, the matched documents with the same identifier will be merged and their relevance scores will be homomorphic added. The procedure of searching index is illustrated in Algorithm 9. CBFSearchItem is the algorithm 3 which lookups the term in CBF. Each term in CBF consists of the encrypted keywords w i and the pointer p points to the posting list of the term w i . The function merge calculates the relevance scores of the matched documents and merges the matched posting lists by executing homomorphic addition on the same documents' relevance scores.
• Rankresult(pl): The data user decrypts the encrypted relevance scores and ranks scores. The data user selects top-k documents' identifier according to their scores and requests them from the server. The procedure of rank is illustrated in Algorithm 10. 
Algorithm 10

VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of our scheme involves two aspects: 1) the confidentiality of documents C, Index I and search keywords Q, i.e. the requirement of data confidentiality in the design goal.
2) The privacy of the additional information in the retrieval process, i.e. the requirement of index privacy and keywords privacy in the design goal.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR DATA CONFIDENTIALITY
The documents collection, the terms in inverted index and the search keywords are encrypted by AES in SICBF. The data user does not need provide AES secret keys to the cloud server throughout the retrieval process. The AES has no academic weakness worse than exhaustive key search and the security strength of AES has been demonstrated in [29] . The confidentiality of the documents collection and the terms in inverted index both are clearly well protected. The relevance scores in inverted index are encrypted by the Paillier cryptosystem. The Paillier cryptosystem is a traditional asymmetric encryption and its security is based on decisional composite residuosity assumption (DCRA) [30] . DCRA is a wellstudied mathematical problem and believed to be intractable. The cloud server can get the public key PK RSC , but the private key SK RSC is only kept by the data owner or authorized user. Paillier cryptosystem is enough secure without getting the private key SK RSC , so the confidentiality of relevance scores is also well protected. Therefore, SICBF can satisfy the requirements of data confidentiality.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR INDEX PRIVACY AND KEYWORD PRIVACY
Chang and Mitzenmacher [31] have shown that relevance scores distribution can be seen as keyword specific from the slope, value range or other metrics. Swaminathan et al. [32] also have shown that term frequency distribution of certain keywords can be very peaky, thus it results in significant information leak. Even we use relevance score instead of term frequency in the inverted index, it still have a chance to get distribution of term frequency by relevance scores [24] . The relevance score distribution of keyword ''resource'' and ''data'' in 7758 text files from test dataset are shown in Figure  8 . An attacker can derive the keywords from these typical relevance scores distribution patterns. Another information leakage is that related terms usually have similarity frequency distribution. For example, the terms ''united'' and ''states'' are very likely appeared at the same time, so their relevance scores have the same distribution. Once an attacker cracks plaintext of ''united,'' he can easy deduce the term that has a similarity score distribution may be ''states.'' For a term t i , we can directly get encrypted relevance scores from I . Relevance score RSC ij will be encrypted by the Paillier cryptosystem to RSC ij . If RSC ij have a stationary distribution, we can deduce the term t i . According to the Paillier algorithm, we will use the public key PK RSC and select random r ∈ Z * n to encrypt the relevance scores, i.e., even the same score will be encrypted into different bits. Since the encrypted relevance scores are totally disrupted, there is no way for term frequency statistical analysis. The attacker can not make statistical analysis on related terms without term frequency information.
In SICBF scheme, the cloud server may get the corresponding relationship between given trapdoors and the encrypted terms in index. The cloud server could use this corresponding relationship and the statistical information of keyword frequency occurring in search keywords to infer the plaintext of the encrypted terms in index [13] . According to trapdoor algorithm, we do not directly send the encrypted search keywords w i to the cloud server, we hide search keywords by using k hash values ∪ k i=1 C h i (x) as trapdoor instead of w i . In particular, we add randomized keywords in trapdoor generation function to ensure even the same search keywords indicated by totally different trapdoor. The keywords are protected by trapdoor and trapdoor frequencies are completely hidden by introducing randomized keywords. Now, the cloud server neither knows the search keywords and their frequency nor the corresponding relationship between the search keywords and the encrypted terms in index. It is impossible to infer the plaintext of the encrypted terms in index without above information.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we demonstrate a thorough experimental evaluation of the proposed scheme on dataset: Request for VOLUME 4, 2016 Comments (RFC) [33] . The RFC dataset contains 7758 text files and total about 394MB. The whole experiment system includes a client and a server. The client uses C language on an windows 7 machine with quad-core Intel I7 CPU running at 2.5 GHz, and the server uses C language on a Linux Server with dual Intel Xeon E7-4809 CPU running at 2.0 GHz. The client acts as the data owner and the authorized user, and the server acts as the cloud server. The performance of our scheme is evaluated regarding the efficiency of SICBF index including lookup efficiency of CBF, the cost of index construction, trapdoor generation and retrieval. We compare our scheme with TRSE proposed by Yu et al [19] .
A. LOOKUP EFFICIENCY OF CBF
In order to lookup an item in pruned CBF, the computing time of h 1 (x), h 2 (x), . . . , h k (x) is fixed. But the linked list length corresponding to the counter is varied which has a greater impact on the lookup efficiency. In order to simplify the analysis, we analyze the probability distribution of the linked list lengths of CBF, and the linked list lengths of pruned CBF are less than CBF. In order to store n items in m bits CBF, the number of actual insertions being performed is nk, each of which is independent. Under the assumption of simple uniform hashing, we can derive the average length of the list in any bucket. With the nk in total, the probability that a bucket received l insertions can be expressed as equation 2. When n = 10 4 , m = 10 6 , k = 8, the probability of linked list length is shown in Figure 9 . The results show that the probability of two items in searched linked list is nearly 1.0 × 10 −3 and the probability of three items in searched linked list is lower than 1.0 × 10 −6 . The linked list length in pruned CBF is much smaller than CBF, so the linked list length has little impact on the lookup efficiency.
B. INDEX CONSTRUCTION
Compared to the plaintext inverted index construction, the encrypted inverted index introduces the encryption cost of relevance scores and overall items. We list in Table 1 our index construction performance for collection of RFC documents. Table 1 shows that the major time is spend on encrypting relevance score and the size of encrypted index is larger than plaintext index. Since the Paillier cryptosystem is asymmetric algorithm like RSA which need more time and space compared with traditional symmetric algorithm. In TRSE, the data owner extracts the collection of l keywords from document collection, builds l + 1 dimensionals document vector for each document, and each dimension of document vector needs to be encrypted by fully homomorphic encryption. The similarity of documents is calculated by vector space model. If there are 4000 different keywords in 1000 text files, a total of 4 million integers need to be encrypted in TRSE. In our scheme, only if each document in 1000 text files includes all 4000 keywords, the total relevance scores need to be encrypted are 4 million integers. Typically, the number of integers need to be encrypted in our scheme are much less than TRSE. Furthermore, for 32-bit integer, the encryption and decryption operation are millisecond-level for the Paillier cryptosystem, and second-level for the best fully homomorphic encryption [34] .
For security reasons, we use 1024-bit private key in the Paillier cryptosystem. The size of ciphertext is about the double size of the plaintext in the Paillier cryptosystem. The size of each plaintext relevance score RSC ij is 32-bit integer, and the size of each encrypted relevance score RSC ij is 2048-bit, that leads to the increase of the size of encrypted index. The indexes are encrypted by fully homomorphic encryption in TRSE, so the size of encrypted index is the size of index multiplies the length of private key. The fully homomorphic encryption has large private key size, usually more than 1MB [20] . The ciphertext expansion in our scheme is better than TRSE. Note that the storage space is not a main issue due to the cheap storage cost on nowadays cloud servers.
C. TRAPDOOR GENERATION
The index construction is the onetime cost before outsourcing, we consider the overhead introduced is reasonably acceptable for rank search. Note that our current implementation is not fully optimized. The parallel algorithm can be expected to further improve the efficiency.
In order to ensure nondeterminacy in the trapdoor generation, we introduce randomized keywords and encrypt each keyword by symmetric key encryption, then calculate encrypted keywords' hash value as the trapdoor. With the increase of search keywords, time costs of trapdoor generation have a slight increase in our scheme. In TRSE, trapdoor is an l dimensional document vector, and each dimension of trapdoor needs to be homomorphic encrypted. Figure 10(a) shows the time to generate a trapdoor of the different lengths of keywords, while Figure 10(b) shows the time to generate trapdoor for queried keywords where the number of keywords in index is fixed with 4000. 
D. RETRIEVAL
Since the retrieval can be processed many times, the overall efficiency is dominated by the retrieval. In TRSE, regardless of whether the document is relevant to the search keywords, all document vectors will be homomorphic multiplied by trapdoor to get the score of each document. Figure 11(a) shows the time cost to calculate scores on the same query which includes 1000 keywords on different scale document collection. Because the Paillier cryptosystem is more efficient than fully homomorphic encryption, and the amount of homomorphic multiplication and addition in TRSE are much larger than that in our scheme. Obviously, the computation cost of our scheme is much less than TRSE. After calculating relevance scores, the data user needs to decrypt scores and rank search result. Figure 11(b) shows the time cost to decrypt relevance scores on the same query which includes 1000 keywords on different scale document collection. At last, the data owner ranks relevance scores and selects top-k documents. This phase is done on the plaintext, the time cost is small and its impact is negligible.
Moreover, we implement the retrieval on android mobile phone which has quad-core CPU running at 2.15 GHz and 4 GB RAM. The trapdoor generation and decrypting relevance scores are done by the user side, and other processes are done by the cloud server. Here, we compare the computation cost of generating trapdoor and decrypting relevance scores on PC and mobile phone. As shown in Figure 12 , it takes more time on mobile device than on PC, but it can be accepted.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we addressed the problem of secure ranked search over encrypted data in the cloud server. In the proposed scheme, counting Bloom filter (CBF) is used to generate the secure index for ranked multiple keywords search. Moreover, several algorithms are designed to maintain and lookup CBF and a pruning algorithm is used to delete the repeat items for saving the space. The Paillier cryptosystem is employed to encrypt relevance scores. It ensures that even the same relevance scores will be encrypted into different bits, which can help to resist statistical analyses. The major computing work in rank is done by the cloud server on the encrypted relevance scores, which make the resource-constraint mobile devices can easily search over encrypted data. Security analyses show the proposed scheme is secure and privacy-preserving. Experiment results on the RFC dataset demonstrate that the proposed scheme is efficiency and has low overhead computation in user side. 
